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Two Simple Protocols 
Frits W. Vaandrager 
Centre tor Mathematics and Computer Science 
P.O. Box 4079, 1009 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
After some introductory remarks about the specification and verification of dis-
tributed systems in the framework of process algebra, simple versions of the 
Alternating Bit Protocol and the Positive Acknowledgement with Retransmission 
protocol are discussed. 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In the ACP formalism we can define (specify) networks of processes which 
cooperate in an asynchronous way. We can do this by looking at the commun-
ication channels in the network as processes which communicate in a synchro-
nous way with the processors to which they are connected. Almost always, this 
synchronous communication will take place according to the handshaking para-
digm: exactly two processes participate in every communication. When we 
specify communications of this type we will employ a read! send communica-
tion function: Let [) be a finite set of data which can be communicated 
between processes, and let IJl> be a finite set of locations (or ports) where syn-
chronous communication can take place. The alphabet of atomic actions now 
consists of read actions rp (d), send actions sp (d) and communication actions 
cp(d) for pEIJl> and dED. As the only communications we have: 
y(rp(d),sp(d)) = cp(d). 
A typical system that can be specified in this way in ACP is depicted in Fig-
ure I. This graphical representation was first used by Jan Willem Klop. The 
corresponding process expression is then for instance: 
aH(P1 llP2 //P3 [/P 4[[Ps llC1 llC2llC3 [[C4llCs). 
Let us stand still for a moment at the issue of the physical interpretation of 
expressions of this type and the question about the nature of the events in 
reality that are modelled by the read and send actions. In general we will 
describe with expressions Pi, P 2 ,. •. and C 1 , C 2 ,... the behaviour of physical 
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objects. p 1 and p2 for example correspond with personal computers, P3 and 
p 4 with disk drives and P 5 with a printer. C 1 up to Cs descnbe cables of a 
network connecting all these machines together. All the com~on~nts have a 
spatial extent. Now we associate with each port name p E~ a pomt m space on 
the border line between two (or more) components (see Figure 2). 
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When process P 1 performs an actions 1(d0) we relate this to the transmission 
of a datum d0 by the personal computer. At the physical level this means that 
at the location (port I) where cable C 1 is connected to the computer variations 
occur in the electric voltage during a certain amount of time. Because d0 can 
have a considerable size (think of a file which is sent to the printer) the 
transmission can take a lot of time. The instantaneous event associated with 
r l(do) occurs at a moment the cable 'knows' that a datum do has been 
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transmitted at port L Such a moment occurs when P 1 has almost finished 
transmission of this datum. The complementary event s I(do) happens at the 
moment that the computer has made so much progress with the transmission 
of d0 that the environment has enough information to 'know' that it is d0 indeed. By defining the events in the right way we can ensure that s l(d0) and 
r l(d0) coincide. It is impossible that s l(d0) occurs and r l(d0) does not, or the 
other way around. Therefore we can consider the occurrence of s l(d0) and 
r l(d0 ) as a single event. This is precisely what we express in process algebra 
with the communication function and the encapsulation operator. Notice that 
the above interpretation of read and send actions is not in conflict with the 
intuition presented in [6) that the instantaneous event associated with an 
atomic process should be situated at the beginning of that process. Apparently 
a command print(d0 ) that one can give to the computer corresponds to a pro-
cess TS l(d0). At the moment process C 1 knows that d0 is transmitted and the 
event c I(d0) occurs, the execution of processes s I(d0 ) and r l(d0 ) will not yet be finished. One possible scenario is that execution of s 1(d0) finishes before 
the end of the execution of r 1(d0 ). 
In process theory we assume that the only thing which is interesting about a 
system is its external behaviour. Two systems with identical external behaviour should be identified in principle. From the point of view of process 
algebra there is no difference between a labourer assembling bicycle pumps, 
and a robot performing the same job. Unless attention is paid in the formal 
specification to all kind of details like fluctuations in productivity due to noc-
turnal excesses, the approaching weekend, depressions because of the mono-
tony of the job, etc. 
In order to realise a certain external behaviour (the specification), often a 
complex internal structure (the implementation) is needed. This brings us to the 
important issue of abstraction. We are interested in a technique which makes it 
possible to abstract from the internal structure of a system, so that we can derive statements about the external behaviour. Abstraction is an indispensable 
tool for managing the complexity of process verifications. This is because 
abstraction allows for a reduction of the complexity (the number of states) of 
subprocesses. This makes it possible to verify large processes in a hierarchical 
way. A typical verification consists of a proof that, after abstraction, an imple-
mentation IMP behaves like the much simpler process SPEC which serves as 
system specification: 
ABS(IMP) = SPEC. 
In process algebra we model abstraction by making the distinction between 
two types of actions, namely external or observable actions and the internal or 
hidden action T, and by introducing explicit abstraction operators 'TJ which 
transform observable actions into the hidden action (see Figure 3). 
Fundamental within the ACP-formalism is the algebraic approach. A 
verification consists of a proof of a statement of the form: 
ACP T + ... I- T1(IMP)=SPEC. 
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FIGURE 3 
The idea is that 'users' can stay in the realm of the formal system and execute 
algebraic manipulations, without the need for an excursion into the semantics. 
2. THE ALTERNATING BIT PROTOCOL 
The most studied communication protocol in existence is undoubtedly the 
Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP). Whenever somewhere in this world someone 
introduces a new formalism for concurrent processes, you can count on it that 
the practical applicability of the formalism is illustrated by means of a 
specification and verification of a variant of the ABP. As a first test-case for a 
concurrency theory the protocol is very appropriate indeed: the protocol can be described in a few words, but the formal specification and verification of it 
forms a non-trivial problem. However, for real practical application of a con-
currency theory much more is needed. In the analysis of realistic protocols one 
encounters various problems of scale which cannot be observed when dealing 
with the ABP. 
We do not want to break with the traditions concerning the ABP, and will 
start here with a discussion of a simple variant of the ABP in the setting of 
process algebra. More complex protocols are dealt with in some other contri-butions of this volume. 
Other discussions of the Alternating Bit Protocol can be found in [2, 8, 10, 12, 15]. In the context of ACP the protocol was verified for the first 
time in [4]. The discussion of the ABP here is based on a streamlined version 
of the proof, given by the author, which can be found in [5]. Variants of the ABP are discussed in the setting of process algebra in [7, 9]. 
2.1. Specification 
The Alternating Bit Protocol can be visualised as follows: 
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Let D be a finite set of data. Elements of D are to be transmitted by the proto-
col from port 1 to port 2. There are four components: a sender S, a receiver R, and two channels K and L. 
2.1.1. Component S. S starts by Reading a Message (RM) at port 1. Then a frame consisting of the message from D and a control bit is transmitted via 
channel K (SF= Send Frame), until a correct acknowledgement has arrived via 
channel L (RA= Receive Acknowledgement). In equations we will always use 
the symbol d to denote elements from the set D, b denotes an element from B = {O, l }, and f finally is used for frames in D XB. In Table I we 'declare' 
the recursive specification that gives the behaviour of component S. After a 
variable has been declared we will use it without mentioning the corresponding 
specification. 
s = RM0 
RMb = ~ r l(d) ·SFdb 
deD 
SFdb = s3(db) ·RAdb 
RAdb = (r5(1-b)+r5(ce)) ·SFdb +r5(b) ·RMl-b 
TABLE I. Recursive specification for component S 
Graphically we can depict process S as in Figure 5. In a certain sense the figure is inaccurate: instead of a node SF" 0 for each element e in D, there is 
only a single node spdO. Between each pair of nodes we draw only one edge, 
which however can be labelled with more than one action. Figure 5 can be 
considered as a 'projection' of the transition diagram belonging to S. 
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2.1.2. Component K. We assume that two things can happen if we send a 
frame into channel K: (1) the message is communicated correctly, (2) the mes-
sage is damaged in transit. We assume that if something goes wrong with the 
message, the receiver hardware will detect this when it computes a checksum (ce =checksum error). Further the channels are supposed to be fair in the 
sense that they will not produce an infinite consecutive sequence of erroneous 
outputs. These are plausible assumptions we have to make in order to prove 
correctness of a protocol that is based on unreliable message passing. Data 
transmission channel K communicates frames in the set D X B from port 3 to 
4. We give the defining equations (Table 2) and the corresponding diagram (Figure 6). 
K = 2: r3(j) -Kl 
leDXB 
Kl = (T ·s4(ce)+T ·s4(j)) -K 
TABLE 2. Defining equations for channel K 
:me T's in the second equation express that the choice whether or not a frame f 
is to be communicated correctly, is nondeterrninistic and cannot be influenced 
by one of the other components. 
2.1.3. Component R. R starts by Receiving a Frame (RF) via channel K. If the 
control bit of the frame is correct, then the message contained in the frame is 
sent to_ port 2 (SM= Send Message). Component R Sends Acknowledgements (SA) via channel L. Figure 7 gives the transition diagram for R. 
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R =RF° 
RFb = ( ~ r4(d(l -b))+r4(ce)) ·SA l-b + ~ r4(db) ·SMdb 
deD deD 
SA b = s6(b) ·RF1-b 
SMdb = s2(d) ·SAb 
TABLE 3. Recursive specification for component R 
s2(d) 
s6(0) 
RFI r4(el) 
dO 
SM 
el 
SM 
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2.1.4. Component L. The task of acknowledgement transmission channel L is 
to communicate boolean values from R to S. The channel may yield error 
outputs but again we assume that this is detected, and that moreover the chan-
nel is fair. See Figure 8 for the diagram. 
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L = ~r6(b) Lb 
beB 
Lb = ('r ·s5(ce)+r ·s5(b)) L 
TABLE 4. Defining equations for channel L 
FIGURE 8 
2.1.5. Sets. Define D=DU(DXB)UBU{ce}. [} is the set of 'generalised' data (i.e. plain data, frames, bits, error) that occur as parameter of atomic actions. We use the notation gED. The second parameter of atomic actions is the set I? = {1,2, ... ,6} of ports. We use symbol p for elements of IP. Com-munication follows the read/ send scheme. This leads to an alphabet 
A= {sp(g), rp(g), cp(g)ipEIP,gED} 
and communications y(sp(g), rp(g))=cp(g) voor p EIP, gED. Define the fol-lowing two subsets of A : 
H = {sp(g), rp(g)ipE{3,4,5,6},gE0}, 
I= {cp(g)ipE{3,4,5,6},gED}. 
Now the ABP is described by 
ABP = T1°an(SllKllRllL) 
This is a good description in the sense that the specifications of the com-ponents S, K, R and L are guarded and consequently the specification of the ABP as a whole has a unique solution. 
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2.2. Verification 
Verification of the ABP amounts to a proof that: 
(1) the protocol will eventually send at port 2 all and only data it has read at 
port I, 
(2) the protocol will output data at port 2 in the same order as it has read 
them at port l. 
This means that, in order to verify the protocol, it is enough to prove the fol-
lowing theorem. 
THEOREM 2.2.1. ACPT +SC+ RDP + RSP +CA+ CFAR f-
ABP = ~ rl(d) ·s2(d) ABP. 
dED 
PROOF. Let J'={cp(g)lpE{3,4,5}, gE[])}. We will use [x] as a notation for 
rr 0 aH(x ). I' is defined in such a way that we just can derive a guarded system 
of equations for [x ]. Consider the following system of recursion equations in 
Table 5. 
(0) x = x<j 
(1) xy = ~rI(d) ·°Xt 
dED 
(2) x'f = r x~h +r x~h 
(3) X'{b = c6(1-b) xqb 
(4) x~b = s2(d) ·X~b 
(5) x~b = c6(b) ·Xc;/1 
(6) x'f = T ·X1b +r x1-b 
TABLE 5. Recursion equations for X 
The transition diagram of X is displayed in Figure 9. We claim that with the 
above mentioned axioms one can prove that X=[SllKllRllL]. We prove this 
by showing that [S llKllR llL] satisfies the same recursion equations (0)-(6) as X 
does. In the computations below, the bold-face part denotes the part of the 
expression currently being 'rewritten'. 
[SllKllRllL] = [RM0 11KllRF°llL] (0) 
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[RM> llKllRFb llL] = 2: r l(d) ·[SF1h llKllRFb llL] 
deD 
= 2:rl(d)·T·[RAdbllKdbllRFbllL] 
deD 
= 2: r l(d) ·[RA db llKdb llRFb llL] 
deD 
't 
(1) 
[RAdbllKdhllRFbllL] = T·[RAdblls4(ce)·KllRFbllL] + (2) 
+ T·[RAdblls4(db) ·KllRFbllL] 
= T·[RAdbllKllSA l-bllL]+ T·[RAdbllKllSMdbllL] 
[RAdbllKllSA1-bllL] = c6(1-b)·[RAdbllKllRFbllL1-b] (3) 
= c6(1-b) ·(r·[RAdb llKllRFblls5(ce) ·L] + 
+ -r ·[RAdb llKllRFb lls5(1-b) ·L]) 
= c6(1-b)·T·T·[SF1bilKllRFblJL] 
= c 6(1-b) ·T·T ·T-[RA db llKdb llRFb llL] 
= c6(1-b)-[RAdbllKdbllRFb llL] 
[RA dbllKllSMdbllL] = s2(d) ·[RA db llKllSA bllL] 
[RA dbllKllSAbllL] = c6(b) ·[RA db llKllRF1-bl1Lb] 
[RA db llKllRF1-b II Lb] = T·[RAdb llKllRF1-b lls5(ce) ·L] + 
+ T ·[RAdb llKllRF1-b lls5(b) ·L} 
= T-[SFdbllKllRF1-bllL]+T·[RM 1-bllKllRF1-bllL] 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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[SF'bllKllRF1-bllL] = T·[RAdbllKdbllRF1-bllL] 
= r·(r·[RAd6 11s4(ce) ·KllRF1-bllL] + 
+ r·[RAdb lls4(db) ·KllRF1-bllL]) 
= r·[RAdbllKllSAbllL] 
33 
(7) 
Now substitute (7) in (6) and apply RSP. Using conditional axiom CA6 we 
have ABP = r1([SllKllRllL]) = ,-1(X) = T1(x</). Further, an application of CFAR gives T1(Xtf) =,. ·r1(JGI') and r1(X~b) = r ·T1(Xl-b). Hence, 
r1(Xf) = 2; r I(d) ·r1(Xqb) = 2; r l(d) ·r1(X<f/') 
dED dED 
= 2; r I(d) ·s 2(d) ·T1(X'f) = 2; r l(d) ·s 2(d) ·T1(XJ-b) dED dED 
and thus 
r1(x</) = 2;rl(d) ·s2(d) · 2;rl(e)·s2(e)·T1(x</) and 
dED eED 
r1(XI) = 2;rl(d)·s2(d)· 2;rl(e)·s2(e)·T1(XI). 
dED eED 
Applying RSP again yields r1(x</) = r1(XI ) and therefore 
r1(x?) = 2; r l(d) ·s 2(d) ·T1(x</ ). 
dED 
This finishes the proof of the theorem. D 
REMARK. Channels Kand L can contain only one datum at a time. Now one 
can say that this is no problem because S and R will never send a message into a channel when the previous one is still there. If S and R would do this 
then our process algebra modelling would be incorrect. Because they don't, 
there is no problem. This argument is correct for the ABP, but one should be 
careful in more complex situations: if one implicitly uses assumptions about the 
behaviour of a system in the specification of that system, then there is a danger 
that a verification shows that the system has a lot of 'wonderful' properties 
which in reality it has not. We give an example. Consider the situation where 
a process S first sends three threatening letters into channel K followed by an 
violent attempt to eliminate process R. Suppose K is a I-datum-buffer. The 
system starts and S sends the first threatening letter into the channel. Now 
receiver R at the other side of the channel is very busy doing other things, and 
has no time to read messages from K. Only after a long, long time R looks if 
there is mail in K. Of course R is really shocked by the contents of the letter, 
and immediately tries to eliminate S. Only after this has succeeded, it reads 
from K again. Because S becomes dangerous only after the third message has been sent, process R will not get into trouble. The crucial point is now that 
this would have been different if K were a FIFO-queue. 
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3. THE PAR PROTOCOL (PART 1) In this section we will describe a protocol that is very similar to the ABP, although there is a fundamental difference. The protocol, that is described in [13], is called PAR, which stands for Positive Acknowledgement with Retransmission. In the protocol the sender waits for an acknowledgement before a new datum is transmitted. Instead of two different acknowledgements, like in the ABP, the PAR protocol only uses one type of acknowledgement (hence the word 'Positive'). This discussion of the PAR protocol is a revised version of Sections 3 and 4 of [14]. 
3.1. Specification The diagram that describes the architecture of the PAR protocol is identical to the diagram for the ABP, with as only difference that on one side of the sender a small timer process has been added. 
s 
/ 
input 
port 
T 
Thus, there are five components: S: Sender 
T: Timer 
K: Data transmission channel 
R: Receiver 
K 
L 
FIGURE 10 
L: Acknowledgement transmission channel 
R 
2 
' output port 
3.1.1. Sets. Let D be a finite set of data. Elements of D are to be transmitted by the PAR. protocol from port l to port 2. Let B = {O, I}. Frames in D x B are_transrrutted by channel K. Define D=DU(DXB)U{ac,ce,st,to} (ac -ac~owled~eme~t, ce~checksum error, st=start timer, to= time out). For the mteract1on with their environment, the components use ports from a set P = { 1,2, ... ,6, 7}. ~ and [} ?ccur as parameters of atomic actions. Alpha-bet A ~d cornmuru~at.J.on funct10n y are defined using the read/ send scheme. In addit.J.on, A contains two other actions i and j which do not communicate. 
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3.1.2. The channels. If a message is sent into channel Kor L, three things can 
happen: 
'. l) the message is communicated correctly, 
:1) the message is damaged in transit, 
)) the message gets lost in the channel 
=.:hannels Kand L are described by the equations in Table 6. 
K 2: r3(j) ·Kl 
jEDXB 
Kl = (i ·s4(f)+i ·s4(ce)+i) ·K 
L = r6(ac)Lac 
Lac = (j ·s S(ac)+ j ·s S(ce)+ j) ·L 
TABLE 6. Definition for channels Kand L 
ne reason why we use actions i and j, instead of the r as is done in the 
pecification of the ABP, will become clear further on . 
. 1.3. The sender. In the specification of the sender process S (Table 7) we use ~rmal variables RHn, span, STdn, wsdn (d ED, n EB): 
'..H == Read a message from the Host at port l. The host process, which is 
not specified here, furnishes the sender with data. 
F == Send a Frame in channel K at port 3. 
T == Start the Timer. 
VS == Wait for Something to happen. Here there are three possibilities: (I) an 
acknowledgement frame arrives undamaged, (2) something damaged 
comes in, or (3) the timer goes off. If a valid acknowledgement comes 
in, the sender fetches the next message, and changes the control bit, 
otherwise a duplicate of the old frame is sent. 
1.4. The timer. The timer process T is very simple (see Table 8). There are 
vo states: the initial (stop-) state and the (run-) state in which the timer is 
mning. In both states the timer can be started, but only in the running state 
time out can be generated. 
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s 
= ~ rl(d)·SFdn 
dED 
spdn = s3(dn)-STdn 
STdn = s ?(st) · WSdn 
WSdn = r5(ac)-RH 1-n +(r5(ce)+r7(to))-SFdn 
TABLE 7. Specification of the sender process S 
T = r?(st)-T' 
T' = r?(st)-T' +s?(to) ·T 
TABLE 8. Specification of the timer process T 
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3.1.5. The receiver. For the specification of the receiver process R (see Table 9) 
we use formal variables wpn, SAn, SHdn (dED, n EB): 
WF = Wait for the arrival of a Frame at port 4. 
SA = Send an Acknowledgement at port 6. 
SH = Send a message to the Host at port 2. In general the host of the receiver 
will of course be di.ff erent than the host of the sender. 
R = WP 
WP = r4(ce)·Wpn+ ~r4(d(I-n))·SAn+ ~r4(dn)·SHdn 
SAn = s6(ac)·Wpn 
SHdn = s2(d)·SA 1-n 
dED dED 
TABLE 9. Specification of the receiver process R 
When a valid frame arrives at the receiver, its control bit is checked to see if it is a duplicate. If not, it is accepted, the message contained in it is written at port 2, and an acknowledgement is generated. Duplicates and damaged frames are not written at port 2. 
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3.1.6. Premature time outs. We define 
H = {sp(g), ry(g)lpE{3,4,5,6,7}, gED} 
and consider the expression 
3H(SllTllKllRllL). 
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Each time after a frame is sent, the sender S starts the timer. An unpleasant 
property of the PAR protocol is that a premature time out can disturb the 
functioning of the protocol. If the sender times out too early, while the ac-
knowledgement is still on the way, it will send a duplicate. When the previous 
acknowledgement finally arrives, the sender will mistakenly think that the just 
sent frame is the one being acknowledged and will not realise that there is 
potentially another acknowledgement somewhere in the channel. If the next 
frame sent is lost completely, but the extra acknowledgement arrives correctly, 
the sender will not attempt to retransmit the lost frame, and the protocol will 
fail. 
An important observation is that in our modelling 'too early' corresponds 
exactly to the availability of an alternative action. Thus we can express the desired behaviour of the timer by giving the action c7(to) a lower priority then 
every other atomic action. In the next section we will elaborate on this idea. 
4. PRIORITIES 
The axiom system ACP8 , introduced in [l], consists of the operators and 
axioms of ACP, extended with a unary priority operator (), an auxiliary binary 
operator <J (unless) and some defining axioms for these operators. We use () to 
model priorities. Parameter of () is a partial order < on the atomic actions. So 
for a,b,c EA we have 
1. -,(a<a) 
2. a<b&b<c~a<c. 
The constant 8 can be incorporated in this ordering as a minimal element. We 
then have o<a for all a EA. Consider, as an example, the following partial 
order on atomic actions a,b and c: 
b<a and c<a. 
Relative to this ordering the operator() will forbid in a sum-context all actions 
that are majorated by one of the other actions in that sum-context. So we have 
for instance: 
(i) O(a+b)=a,O(a+c)=abut 
(ii) O(b+c)=b+c. 
Operator() is axiomatized in the system ACP8 (see Table 10). 
Ex.AMPLE. Let b <a and c <a. Then: 
(i) O(a + b) = O(a)<]b + O(b)<]a = a<]b + b<]a =a+ o =a, (ii) O(b + c) = O(b)<Jc + O(c)<]b = b<Jc + c<]b = b + c, 
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(iii) O(b(a + c)) = 8(b) ·O(a + c) = b ·(8(a)<!c + O(c)<!a) = b(a<!c + c<!a) 
= b (a + 8) = ba. 
ACPo 
x+y=y+x Al a<!b =a if .....,(a<b) Pl 
x +(Y +z) = (x +y)+z A2 a<!b = 8 if a<b P2 
x+x = x A3 x<1Yz = x<!Y P3 (x +y)z = xz +yz A4 x<!(Y+z) = (x<!Y)<!z P4 (xy)z = x(Yz) AS xy<!z == (x<!z)y P5 
x+a = x A6 (x +y)<]z = x<1z +y<!z P6 
8x = 8 A7 
a lb == y(a,b) CF 
xl[y == xlly+yllx+xly CMl 8(a) = a THl 
all_x = ax CM2 O(xy) = O(x) ·O(Y) TH2 
axll_y = a(xl[y) CM3 O(x + y) = 8(x )<!Y + O(y )<Jx TH3 (x +y)llz = xllz +yllz CM4 
(a.x)lb =(a lb)x CM5 
a l(bx) = (a lb)x CM6 
(ax)l(by) = (a lb)(xl[y) CM7 
(x+y)lz = xlz+ylz CM8 
xl(Y+z) = xly+xlz CM9 
aH(a) = a if ar:;.H Dl 
aH(a) = a if a EH D2 
aH(x +y) = aH(x)+aH(Y) D3 
3H(xy) = aH(x)·aH(Y) D4 
TABLE 10 
In [ l] the proof can be found of the following theorem: 
THEOREM 4.1. 
i) For each recursionfree closed ACP0-term s there is a basic term t such that ACPo 1- s = t. 
ii) ACPo is a conservative extension of ACP, i.e. for all recursionfree ACP-
terms s,t we have: ACPo I- s =t zj ACP I- s =t. 
At present it is not altogether clear how ACP8 and ACP.,. should be combined into ACP.,.e. As a consequence of Theorem 4.1 however we can give meaning to 
a term like -r1(s), where sis a recursion-free closed ACPe-term. Expression s is 
related to exactly one ACP process, and ACP.,. is a conservative extension of 
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ACP. For infinite processes the situation is a bit more complicated. Without 
proof we mention that for the theory of regular process expressions ( expres-
sions that generate a finite transition diagram) we also have conservativity. 
5. THE PAR PROTOCOL (PART 2) 
Returning to the specification of the PAR protocol we define operator (}on the 
basis of the following partial ordering < on A: 
(1) a<c7(st) for aEA-{c7(st)} 
(2) c7(to)<a for aEA-{c7(to)}. 
The reason for giving action c 7(to) a lower priority than the other actions has 
already been given in Section 3.1.6. In addition we have given action c7(st) a 
higher priority than the other actions in order to express that immediately 
after sending a message the timer is started. This assumption is not essential 
for the correctness of the protocol. The system as a whole is now described by 
B0 a H(S II TllKllR llL ). 
The fact that in the scope of a priority operator no r's are allowed explains the 
use of i and j actions in the specification of components K and L. We are 
only interested in the actions taking place at ports I and 2. The other actions 
cannot be observed. 
I= { cp (g) Ip E {3,4,5,6, 7}, gE ID} U {i,j} 
The PAR protocol can now be specified by: 
PAR = r1°0°oH(SIJTllKllRllL) 
For a verification of the protocol it is enough to prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 5.1. ACP7 + ACPo +SC+ RDP + RSP +CA+ CFAR f-
PAR= ~ r I(d)·s2(d)·PAR 
deD 
PRooF. Let I'= {cp(g)lpE{4,5,7},gED} U{i,j}. We use [x] as notation for 
rr 00°oH(x). Since I' c;;J we can apply axiom CA6: 
PAR= T1([SllT/IKllRllL]). 
In the first part of the proof we will derive a guarded system of recursion 
equations for the process expression [SllTllKllRllL] in which only the opera-
tors + and · occur. Thereafter, in the second part, we will abstract from the 
other internal actions using CFAR. Throughout the proof d ranges over D and 
n ranges over B. The transition diagram of [SllTllKllRllL] is depicted in Fig-
ure 11. 
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FIGURE 11 
[SllTllKllRllL] = [RH0 11TllKllWF°llL] 
[RHnllTllKllWPllL] = ~rl(d)'[SFdnllTllKllWPllL] 
deD 
[SFdnllTllKllWPllL] = c3(dn) ·[STdn llTllKdnllWPllL] 
= c3(dn)·[WSdnllrrllKdnllWFnllL] 
dl 
x 
5 
s2(d) 
dl 
x 
4 
't 
xd1 
3 
c3(dl) 
dl 
x 
2 
rl(d) 
x1 
l 
(0) 
(1) 
(2) 
(Here we used that the action c7(st) has higher priority than the other actions.) 
[WSdnllT'llKdnllWPllL] = Tr 0 8(c7(to}·oH(SFdnllTllKdnllWPllL) + (3) 
+ i ·oH(WSdnllT'lls4(dn)·KllWFnllL) + 
+ i ·oH(WSdnllT'lls4(ce)·KllWFnllL) + 
+ i ·oH(WsdnllT'llKll WPllL)) 
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(Action c7(to) has lower priority than the other actions.) 
= T·[WsdnllTrllKllSHdnllL] + 
+ T·[SFdn llTllKll WF" llL] 
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(If the message is damaged, the resulting state is the same as in the case in 
which the message gets lost. In both cases a time out event occurs.) 
[WSdnllT'llKllSHdn llL] =s2(d) ·[WSdnJIT'llKllSA !-nllL] (4) 
[WSdnllT'llKllSA l-n llL] =c6(ac) ·[WSdnllT'llKllWF1-nllLac] 
[WSdnllT'llKllWF1-nllLacJ =r·[RH 1-nllT'llKllWF1-nllL] + 
+ T·[SFdnlJT'llKllWF1-nllL] + 
+ T·[SFdnJJTllKllWF1-nllL] 
[RHnllT'llKll WF" llL] = ~ r l(d)·[SFdnJIT'llKllWF"llL] 
dED 
[SFdn llT'llKll WF" llL] = c3(dn)·[WSdnllT'llKdnll WF"llL] 
[SFdn llT'llKll WF 1-nllL] =c3(dn) ·[WSdn llT'llKdnll WF1-nllL] 
[SFdn llTllKll WF 1-n llL] =c3(dn) ·[WSdn llT'llKdn llWF1-n llL] 
[WSdn llT'llKdn llWF1-n llL] =T"[SFdnllT'llKll WF1-n llL] + 
+ T·[WSdnllT'llKllSA I-nllL] 
(5) 
(6) 
(la) 
(2a) 
(7) 
(7a) 
(8) 
Now observe that the processes of equations l and la, 2 and 2a, and 7 and 7a 
are identical. This means we have derived that X ( = [S II TllKllR llL]) satisfies 
the system of recursion equations in Table 11. 
(0) x =X1f 
(1) X1/ = ~rl(d)·X~n (5) x~n = c 6( ac) -xgn 
dED 
(2) xqn = c3(dn)·X~n (6) xtn = r-x1-n + 'T xqn 
(3) x~n = r·xqn + T·X~n (7) x~n = c3( dn) -xgn 
(4) x~n = s 2(d) x~n (8) xgn = 'T xgn + T ·X~n 
TABLE 11. Recursion equations for X 
This finishes the first part of the proof. In the second part we will abstract 
from the communications at ports 3 and 6. Because PAR= T1(X)= r1(X1f), it 
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is enough to show that 
T1(XI) = ~ rl(d) ·s2(d) ·T1(XI). 
deD 
For d and n fixed, variables Xf and X~n form a conservative cluster from I. Hence we can apply CF AR: 
T1(xf) = 'T ''TJ(Xf ). 
Variables x~n, X'/:', Xf and xgn (d and n fixed) also form a conservative clus-
ter from I. CFAR gives: 
T1(Xf) = 'T'T1(X\-n). 
We use these two results in the following derivation: 
T1(X'/) = ~ rl(d) ·Tr(X~n) 
dED 
= ~ rl(d) ·T·Tr(X~n) 
deD 
= ~rl(d)·s2(d)·T1(X~n) 
deD 
= ~rl(d)·s2(d)·T1(Xl-n). 
dED 
Substituting this equation in itself gives: 
T1(XI) = ~rl(d)·s2(d)· ~rl(e)·s2(e)·r1(Xf) and deD eeD 
Tr(XI) = ~rl(d)·s2(d)· ~rl(e)·s2(e)·r1(X\). 
deD eED 
Due to the Recursive Specification Principle we have: 
T1(XI) = r1(X\ ). 
Hence 
T1(XI)= ~rl(d)·s2(d)·T1(Xf), 
deD 
which is the desired result. 0 
REMARK. For the modelling of time outs in the PAR protocol the use of the priority operator is not essential. We sketch an alternative. If a frame gets lost in one of the channels then one can say that this event in a sense causes a time out. This causal relationship can be expressed in process algebra by means of a communication between the channel and the pair sender/timer. For channels K and L the specifications then become as shown in Table 12. 
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K -j ~ r3(f)·K 
jEDXB 
K_f = (i ·s4(f)+i ·s4(ce)+i ·s7(to)) ·K 
-~ 
-L = (j·s5(ac)+j·s5(ce)+j·s7(to))·L 
TABLE 12. Specification for channels Kand L 
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In a time out event three processes participate: the timer, the sender and a 
channel. This means that when dealing with time outs we have ternary com-
munication at port 7. 
y(s7(to),s7(to)) = ss7(to) y(s7(to),r7(to)) = sr?(to) 
y(s7(to),sr7(to)) = c7(to) y(r7(to),ss7(to)) = c?(to) 
This leads to a slightly bigger set of unsuccessful communications: 
H = HU{ss7(to),sr7(to)}. 
The alternative specification of the PAR protocol now becomes. 
One can prove that PAR =PAR. In [11], essentially the above idea is used to 
specify a simple version of the PAR protocol. 
5.2. Asymmetric communication 
Consider the situation where channel K contains a frame and the receiver is doing some other things and reads the datum from K only after a long time. Now one can consider it to be unnatural that during this whole period the datum keeps 'floating' in K and does not disappear. In a more realistic 
approach we would assume that if a datum is contained in channel K, either this is read by process R, or it gets lost if R is not willing to receive. Formally 
we can model this in process algebra by not encapsulating s4(d) actions, but give them a lower priority than the corresponding c4(d) actions. This mechan-ism is called put mechanism in [3]. One can prove that the ABP and the PAR protocol are invariant under the use of the put mechanism. 
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